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ABSTRACT
Real network datasets provide significant benefits for understand-
ing phenomena such as information diffusion or network evolu-
tion. Yet the privacy risks raised from sharing real graph datasets,
even when stripped of user identity information, are significant.
When nodes have associated attributes, the privacy risks increase.
In this paper we quantitatively study the impact of binary node
attributes on node privacy by employing machine-learning-based
re-identification attacks and exploring the interplay between graph
topology and attribute placement. Our experiments show that the
population’s diversity on the binary attribute consistently degrades
anonymity.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Real graph datasets are fundamental to understanding a variety
of phenomena, such as epidemics, adoption of behavior, crowd
management and political uprisings. At the same time, many such
datasets capturing computer-mediated social interactions are recorded
nowadays by individual researchers or by organizations. How-
ever, while the need for real social graphs and the supply of such
datasets are well established, the flow of data from data own-
ers to researchers is significantly hampered by serious privacy
risks: even when humans’ identities are removed, studies have
proven repeatedly that de-anonymization is doable with high suc-
cess rate [18, 22, 30, 43]. Such de-anonymization techniques recon-
struct user identities using third-party public data and the graph
structure of the naively anonymized social network: specifically, the
information about one’s social ties, even without the particularities
of the individual nodes, is sufficient to re-identify individuals.
Many anonymization methods have been proposed to mitigate
the privacy invasion of individuals from the public release of graph
data [21]. Naive anonymization schemes employ methods to scrub
identities of nodes without modifying the graph structure. Struc-
tural anonymization methods change the topology of the original
graph while attempting to preserve (at least some of) the original
graph characteristics [25, 26, 36]. Often the utility of an anonymized
graph depends not only on preserving essential graph properties
of the original graph, but also node attributes such as labels that
identify nodes as cheaters or noncheaters in online gaming plat-
forms [4].
However, the effects of node attributes on the risks of re-identifications
are not yet well understood. While intuitively any extra piece of
information can be a danger to privacy, a rigorous understanding of
what topological and attribute properties affect the re-identification
risks is needed. In cases such as information dissemination, node at-
tributes may be informed by the local graph topology. How does the
interplay between topology and node attributes affect node privacy?
Ourwork assesses the additional vulnerability to re-identification
attacks posed by the attributes of a labeled graph. We consider ex-
actly one binary attribute to understand the lower bound of the
damage that node attributes inflict. We focus our empirical study
on the interplay between topology and labeling as a leverage point
for re-identification. Because our focus is to understand in which
conditions node re-identification is feasible, this study is indepen-
dent of any anonymization technique. We apply machine learning
techniques that use both topological and attribute information to re-
identify nodes based on a common threat model. Our study involves
real-world graphs and synthetic graphs in which we control how
labels are placed relative to ties to mimic the ubiquitous phenomena
of homophily found in social graphs [28].
Our empirical results show that the vulnerability to node re-
identification depends on the population diversity with respect to
the attribute considered. Using information about the distribution
of labels in a node’s neighborhood provides additional leverage for
the re-identification process, even when labels are rudimentary. Fur-
thermore, we quantify the relative importance of attribute-related
and topological features in graphs of different characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
outlines the related work. The system model to quantify anonymity
is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the characteristics of
the datasets we used in our empirical investigations. we present
our results in Section 5 and discuss our contributions in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
The availability of auxiliary data helps reveal the true identities of
anonymized individuals, as proven empirically in large privacy vio-
lation incidents [7, 23]. Similarly, in the case of graph de-anonymization
attacks, information from an auxiliary graph is used to re-identify
the nodes in an anonymized graph [31]. The quality of such an
attack is determined by the rate of correct re-identification of the
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original nodes in the network. In general, de-anonymization attacks
harness structural characteristics of nodes that uniquely distinguish
them [21]. Many such attacks can be categorized into seed-based
and seed-free, based on the prior seed knowledge available to an
attacker [21].
In seed-based attacks, sybil nodes [3] or some known map-
pings of nodes in an auxiliary graph aid the re-identification of
anonymized nodes [18, 19, 22, 30, 43]. The effectiveness of such
attacks is influenced by the quality of the seeds [39].
In seed-free attacks, the problem of deanonymization is usually
modeled as a graph matching problem. Several research efforts have
proposed statistical models for the re-identification of nodes with-
out relying on seeds, such as the Bayesian model [33] or optimiza-
tion models [16, 17]. Many heuristics are used in the propagation
process of re-identification, exploiting graph characteristics such
as degree [8], k-hop neighborhood [48], linkage-covariance [2],
eccentricity [31], or community [32].
Recently, there have been efforts to incorporate node attribute
information into deanonymization attacks. Gong et al. [6] eval-
uate the combination of structural and attribute information on
link prediction models. Attributes not present may be inferred
through prior knowledge and network homophily. Qian et al. [35]
apply link prediction and attribute inference to deanonymization
by quantifying the prior background information of an attacker
using knowledge graphs. In knowledge graphs, edges not only rep-
resent links between nodes but also node-attribute links and link
relationships among attributes. The deanonymization attack in [14]
maps node-attribute links between an anonymized graph and its
auxiliary. In addition to structural similarity, nodes are matched by
attribute difference, the union of the attributes of the node in the
anonymized and auxiliary divided by their intersection.
However, the success rate of a de-anonymization process is of-
ten reported in the literature as dependent on the chosen heuristic
of the attack, which is typically designed with knowledge of the
anonymization technique. Comparing the strengths of different
anonymization techniques thus becomes challenging, if not im-
possible. Recently, Sharad [39] proposed a general threat model to
measure the quality of a deanonymization attack which is indepen-
dent of the anonymization scheme. He proposed a machine learning
framework to benchmark perturbation-based graph anonymiza-
tion schemes. This framework explores the hidden invariants and
similarities to re-identify nodes in the anonymized graphs [40, 41].
Importantly, this framework can be easily tuned to model various
types of attacks.
Several researchers propose theoretical frameworks to exam-
ine how vulnerable or deanonymizable any (anonymized) graph
dataset is, given its structure [15, 16, 20, 34]. However, some tech-
niques are based on Erdös-Rènyi (ER) models [34], while others
make impractical assumptions about the seed knowledge [15]. Ji
et al. [20] also introduced a configuration model to quantify the
deanonymizablity of graph datasets by considering the topological
importance of nodes. The same set of authors analyzed the impact
of attributes on graph data anonymity [14]. They show a significant
loss of anonymity when more node-attribute relations are shared
between anonymized and auxiliary graph data. Specifically, they
measure the entropy present in node-attribute mappings available
for an attacker. As the entropy decreases, the graph loses node
anonymity.
The main aspects distinguishing this study from existing works
are as follows: i) In our work, we study the inherent conditions
in graphs that provide resistance/vulnerability to a general node
re-identification attack based on machine learning techniques. ii)
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that quantifies
the privacy impact of node attributes under an attribute attachment
model biased towards homophily. iii) We analyze the interplay be-
tween the intrinsic vulnerability of the graph structure and attribute
information.
3 METHODOLOGY
Our main objective is to quantitatively estimate the vulnerability
to re-identification attacks added by node attributes. In particular,
we ask: Given a graph topology, how much better does a node re-
identification attack perform when the node attributes are included in
the attack compared to when there is no node attribute information
available to the attacker?
We are interested in measuring the intrinsic vulnerability of a
graph with attributes on nodes, in the absence of any particular
anonymization technique on topology or node attributes. The in-
tuition is that particular graphs are inherently more private: for
example, in a regular graph, nodes are structurally indistinguishable.
Adding attributes to nodes, however, may contribute extra informa-
tion that could make the re-identification attack more successful.
Consider another example, in a highly disassortative network (such
as a sexual relationships network), knowing the attribute values
(i.e., gender) of a few nodes will quickly lead to correctly inferring
the attribute values of the majority of nodes, and thus possibly con-
tributing to the re-identification of more nodes. Thus, the questions
we address in this study also include: How does the distribution of
node attributes affect the intrinsic vulnerability to a re-identification
attack of a labeled graph topology?
To answer these question, we developed a machine learning-
based re-identification attack inspired from that presented in [39].
We use the same threat model (Section 3.1) that aims at finding
a bijective mapping between nodes in two different graphs. We
mount a machine-learning based attack (Section 3.2), in which the
algorithm learns the correct mapping between some pairs of nodes
from the two graphs, and estimates the mapping of the rest of the
dataset. As input data, we use both real and synthetic datasets (as
presented in Section 4).
3.1 The Threat Model
The threat model we consider is the classical threat model in this
context [34]: The attacker aims to match nodes from two networks
whose edge sets are correlated. We assume each node is associated
with a binary valued attribute, and this attribute is publicly available.
Common examples of such attributes are gender, professional level
(i.e., junior or senior), or education level (i.e., higher education or
not).
For clarity, consider the following example: an attacker has ac-
cess to two networks of individuals in an organization that represent
the communication patterns (e.g., email) and friendship informa-
tion available from an online social network. Individuals in the
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communication network are described by professional seniority
(e.g., junior or senior), while individuals in the friendship network
are described by gender. These graphs are structurally overlapping,
in that some individuals are present in both graphs, even if their
identities have been removed. The attacker’s task is to find a bijec-
tive mapping between the two subsets of nodes in the two graphs
that correspond to the individuals present in both networks.
3.2 Machine Learning Attack
We assume that the adversary has a sanitized graphGsan that could
be associated with an auxiliary graphGaux for the re-identification
attack (as depicted in Figure 1). As in the scenario discussed above,
Gsan could be the communication network, while Gaux is the
friendship network of a set of individuals in an organization.
In order to model this scenario using real data, we split a real
dataset graph G = (V ,E) into two subgraphs G1 = (V1,E1) and
G2 = (V2,E2), such that V1 ⊂ V , V2 ⊂ V and V1 ∩V2 = Vα , where
Vα , ϕ. The fraction of the overlap α is measured by the Jaccard
coefficient of two subsets: α = |V1∩V2 ||V1∪V2 | . In the shared subgraph
induced by the nodes in Vα , nodes will preserve their edges with
nodes fromVα but might have different edges to nodes that are part
of V1 −Vα or part of V2 −Vα . Each nodes v ∈ V1 ∪V2 maintains its
original attribute value.
In an optimistic scenario, an attacker has access to a part of the
original graph (e.g., G1) as auxiliary data and to an unperturbed
subgraph (e.g., G2) as the sanitized data whose nodes the attacker
wants to re-identify. We use G1 and G2 as baseline graphs to mea-
sure the impact of attributes on de-anonymizability of network
data. It is also possible to split G1 and G2 recursively into multi-
ple overlapping graphs, maintaining the same values of overlap
parameters as above. This allows us to assess the feasibility of
the de-anonymization process for large networks by significantly
reducing the size of G1 and G2.
The resulting graphs are now the equivalent of the email/friendship
networks we used as an example above. The overlap is the knowl-
edge repository that the attacker uses for de-anonymization [11].
Part of this knowledge will be made available to the machine learn-
ing algorithms.
Previous work shows that the larger α , the more successful the
attack. However, the relative success of attacks under different
anonymization schemes is observed to be independent of α [39].
In order to experiment with a homogeneous attack, we set the
value of α = 0.2, and we buildVα by building a breadth-first-search
tree starting from the highest degree node (BFS-HD) in G. While
other alternatives are certainly possible, we chose this approach
for two reasons. First, it appears that the threat model we used is
quite sensitive to the sampling process when generating G1 and
G2 [34]. To avoid sampling bias, we chose a BFS-HD split to have a
deterministic set of nodes inVα . Second, we empirically found that
BFS-HD provides the maximally informed seeds for an adversary to
propagate the re-identification process, thus providing a best-case
scenario for the attacker.
3.2.1 Node Signatures. Sincewe are employingmachine learn-
ing techniques to re-identify nodes in a graph, we need to represent
nodes as feature vectors. We define the node u’s features using a
combination of two vectors made up from its neighborhood degree
Figure 1: Graph mining system flow to generate node pairs
with the ground truth of identical and non-identical pairs.
distribution (NDD) and neighborhood attribute distribution (NAD)
(as depicted in Figure 2).
NDD is a vector of positive integers where NDDqu [k] represents
the number of u’s neighbors at distance q with degree k . We con-
catenate the binned version of NDD1u with the binned version of
NDD2u to define the node u’s NDD signature. We use a bin size of
50, which was shown empirically [39] to capture the high degree
variations of large social graphs. For each q, we use 21 bins, which
would correspond to a larger node degree of 1050. All larger values
are binned in the last bin. This binning strategy is designed to cap-
ture the aggregate structure of ego networks, which is expected to
be robust against edge perturbation [38].
NAD is defined by NADqu [i] which represents the number of
u’s neighbors at distance q with an attribute value i . It is shown
experimentally that the use of neighbor attributes as features often
improves the accuracy of edge classification tasks [27].
We use the notation GS to represent the prediction results from
the input features made up from the topology (e.g., NDD). GS(LBL)
to represent features from both the topology and attribute informa-
tion (e.g., concatenation of NDD and NAD vectors).
3.2.2 Random Forest Classification. Note that the nodes in
Gsan ∩Gaux , common to both graphs, can be recognized as being
the same node (identical) in the two graphs based on their node
identifier. Non-identical nodes are unique to each Gsan and Gaux
and would not exist in the overlap. In the classification task, we
wish to output 1 for an identical node pair and 0 for a non-identical
node pair. This is the ground truth against which we measure the
accuracy of the learning algorithms.
We generate examples for the training phase of the deanonymiza-
tion attack by randomly picking node pairs from the sanitized
(Gsan ) and the auxiliary (Gaux ) graphs, respectively. In most cases,
we have an unbalanced dataset with the degree of imbalance de-
pending on the overlap parameter α , where the majority is non-
identical node pairs. We use the reservoir sampling technique [9] to
take ℓ = 1000 balance sub-samples from the population S , and the
SMOTE algorithm [5] as an over-sampling technique for each sub-
sample. Each sample is trained by a forest of 100 random decision
trees that allows the algorithm to learn features. Gini-index is used
as an impurity measure for the random forest classification. Given
the size α of the overlap, we measure the quality of the classifier
on the task of differentiating two nodes as identical or not.
3.2.3 Metrics. We measure the accuracy of the classifier in de-
termining whether a randomly chosen pair of nodes (with one node
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Figure 2: Example of a node signature defined as a combined
feature vector made up from NDD and NAD vectors. In the
NDD vector, each bin value corresponds to the number of
nodes that have a degree value represented in the bin range,
such that the jth bin holds the nodes in the degree (kj ) range
j × b ≤ kj < (j + 1) × b. If the degree exceeds the maximum
range, such nodes are included in the last bin. Further, both
1-hop and 2-hop NDDs are calculated andmerged. For exam-
ple, node x has no 1-hop neighbor nodes that have degree
in the range of 1 − 2, and one 2-hop neighbor node that its
degree is in the range of 1 − 2. In the NAD vector, each el-
ement corresponds to the number of nodes with the given
attribute. Both 1-hop and 2-hop NADs are calculated and
merged. Node x has one 1-hop neighbor node, and two 2-hop
neighbor nodes with the attribute Red. Note that the node
value represents the associated degree, and the border color
represents the node attribute Red or Blue.
inGsan and another inGaux ) are identical or not. We use F1-score
to evaluate the quality of the classifier. F1-score is the harmonic
mean between precision and recall, typical metrics for prediction
output of machine learning algorithms.
For each data sample, we perform 5 × 2 cross-validation to eval-
uate the classifier and record the mean F1-score. We thus build
two vectors of mean F1-scores, each of size ℓ = 1000 (as described
above), one for the labeled (GS(LBL)) and one for the unlabeled
network topology (GS). An important aspect of these vectors is
that they are related in the sense that the ith element in one vector
represents the same sample as the ith element of the other vector.
This is important for the pairwise comparison of the two mean
F1-score vectors.
We perform a standard T-test on these two vectors and report
the T-statistic value. The T-statistic value is a measure of how close
to the hypothesis an estimated value is. In our case, the hypothesis
is the prediction accuracy of the node identities in the unlabeled
graph (GS) and the estimated value is the prediction accuracy in the
labeled graph (GS(LBL)). Thus, a large T-statistic value implies a sig-
nificantly better prediction accuracy of node identities in GS(LBL)
than in GS. In such cases, we can say that the network with node
attributes is more vulnerable to node re-identification. This value
serves as our statistical measurement to quantify the vulnerability
cost of node attributes.
4 DATASETS
Because our work is empirically driven, a larger set of test datasets
promises a better understanding of the relations between vulnera-
bility to re-identification attacks and the particular characteristics
of the node attributes (such as fractions of attributes of a particular
value or the assignment of attributes to topologically related nodes).
In this respect, real datasets are always preferable to synthetic ones,
as they potentially encapsulate phenomena that are missing in the
graph generative models. As an example, until very recently, the
relation between the local degree assortativity coefficient and node
degree was not captured in graph topology generators [37].
However, relying only on real datasets has its limitations, due
to the scarcity of relevant data (in this case, networks with binary
node attributes) and the difficulty of covering the relevant space of
graph metrics when relying only on available real datasets. Thus, in
this work, we combine real networks (described in Section 4.1) with
synthetic networks generated from the real datasets. For generating
synthetic labelled networks, we employ ERGMs [12, 47] and a
controlled node-labeling algorithm as described in Section 4.2.
4.1 Real Network Datasets
We chose six publicly available datasets from four different contexts
and generated eight networks with binary node attributes.
• polblogs [1] is an interaction network between political
blogs during the lead up to the 2004 US presidential election.
This dataset includes ground-truth labels identifying each
blog as either conservative or liberal.
• fb-dartmouth, fb-michigan, and fb-caltech [46] are Face-
book social networks extant at three US universities in 2005.
A number of node attributes such as dorm, gender, gradua-
tion year, and academic major are available. We chose two
such attributes that could be represented as binary attributes:
gender and occupation, whereby occupation we could iden-
tify the attribute values “student” and “faculty”. From each
dataset, we obtained two networks with the same topology
but different node attribute distributions.
• pokec-1 [44] is a sample of an online social network in
Slovakia. While the Facebook samples are university net-
works, Pokec is a general social platform whose membership
comprises 30% of the Slovakian population. pokec-1 is a
one-fortieth sample. This dataset has gender information
available as a node attribute.
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• amazon-products [24] is a bi-modal projection of categories
in an Amazon product co-purchase network. Nodes are la-
beled as “book” or “music”, edges signify that the two items
were purchased together.
As Table 1 shows, the networks generated from these datasets
have different graph characteristics. For example, the density (d) of
the graphs varies across three orders of magnitude, while degree
assortativity oscillates between disassortative (for polblogs, r =
−0.22, where there are more interactions between popular and
obscure blogs than expected by chance) to assortative (as expected
for social networks). All topologies except for amazon-products
have small average path length.
The metrics p and τ shown in Table 1 are inspired from the
synthetic node labeling algorithm used for generating synthetic
graphs (and presented later), and they also show high variation
across different networks. Intuitively, p captures the diversity of
attribute values in the node population (with p = 0.5 showing equal
representation of the attributes) while τ captures the homophily
phenomenon (that functions as an attraction force between nodes
with identical attribute values). The homophilic attraction metric
τ varies between 0 in pokec-1 (thus, no higher than chance pref-
erence for social ties with people of the same gender in Slovakia)
to 0.99 in amazon-products (books are purchased together with
other books much more strongly than given by chance). The di-
versity metric p varies between the overrepresentation of males in
the US academic Facebook networks (8% female representation) to
an almost perfect political representation in the polblogs dataset
(where p = 0.48). Note that, we only consider p as the minimum
proportion of two node groups due to the symmetric nature of
attributes in our experiments.
This wide variation in graph metrics values is what motivated
our choice for these set of real networks. We opted to include the
three Facebook networks from similar contexts to also capture more
subtle variations in network characteristics.
4.2 Synthetic Graphs
In order to be able to control graph characteristics and node at-
tribute distributions, we also generated a number of synthetic
graphs comparable with the real datasets just described. The graph
generation included two aspects: topology generation, for which
we opted for ERGMs, and node attribute assignments, for which
we implemented the technique proposed in [42].
4.2.1 Varying Topology via ERGMs. Exponential-family random
graph models (ERGMs) or p-star models [12, 47] are used in social
network analysis for stipulating, within a set structural parame-
ters, distribution probabilities for networks. Its primary use is to
describe structural and local forces that shape the general topology
of a network. This is achieved by using a selected set of parameters
that encompass different structural forces (e.g., homophily, degree
correlation/assortativity, clustering, and average path length). Once
the model has converged, we can obtain maximum-likelihood esti-
mates, model comparison and goodness-of-fit tests, and generate
simulated networks tied to the relationship between the original
network and the probability distribution provided by the ERGM.
Our interest in ERGMs is based on simulating graphs that retain
set structural information from the original graph to generate a
diverse set of graph structures. We used R [45] and the statnet
suite [10], which contains several packages for network analysis, to
produce ERGMs and simulate graphs from our real-world network
datasets. In this case, we focused on three structural aspects of
the graphs: clustering coefficient, average path length, and degree
correlation/assortativity.
For the ERGM based on clustering coefficient, we used the edges
and triangle parameters in the statnet package. The edges pa-
rameter measures the probability of linkage or no linkage between
nodes, and the triangle term looks at the number of triangles or
triad formations in the original graph. For the average path length
model, edges and twopath terms were used. The twopath term
measures the number of 2-paths in the original network and pro-
duces a probability distribution of their formation for the converged
ERGM. Lastly, for the assortativity measure, the terms edges and
degcor were used to produce the models. The degcor term consid-
ers the degree correlation of all pairs of tied nodes (for more on
ERGMs see [13, 29]). These terms proved to be our best choices for
preserving, to a certain extent, the desired structural information.
Although the creation of ERGMs is a trial and error process, the
selected terms were successful in producing models for each of the
original networks.
After a successful model convergence, a simulated graph was
generated constraining the number of edges to those of the origi-
nal graph for each model. It is worth mentioning that within the
built-in simulate function in the statnet suite there is no way of
forcibly constraining the aspects of the original we want to control.
Thus, we experience variation, in some cases more than others. The
difference between the original and the simulated graphs seemed
more prominent for smaller networks (see Table 1 and Table 2 for
comparison) than models based on the larger networks which came
closer to the real values of the original graphs.
4.2.2 Synthetic Labeling. A simple model that parameterizes
a labeled graph with a tendency towards homophily (ties dispro-
portionately between those of similar attribute background) is an
“attraction” model [42]. In the basic case of a binary attribute vari-
able and a constant tendency to inbreed, two parameters, p and
τ , both in the (0,1) interval, characterize the distribution of ties
within and between the two groups. The first is the proportion of
the population that takes on one value of the attribute (with 1 − p,
the proportion taking on the other value). The second parameter,
the inbreeding coefficient or probability, expresses the degree to
which a tie whose source is in one group is "attracted" to a target
in that group. When τ = 0, there is no special attraction and ties
within and between groups occur in chance proportions. When
τ > 0, ties occur disproportionately within groups, increasing as τ
approaches 1. Given a total number of ties, values for p and τ de-
termine the number of ties/edges that are between groups, namely,
δ = |E | × 2 × (1 − τ )p(1 − p).
In the process of generating synthetic node attributes, we first
randomly assign two arbitrary values (i.e., R and B) as labels to all
the nodes in the graph for a given p, 1−p split. Then, we draw an R
node and a B node at random and swap labels if it would decrease
the number of R-B ties. This process would converge when the total
number of cross-group ties reduce to δ for a particular value of τ .
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Table 1: Graph properties of the real network datasets. All graphs are undirected, and nodes are annotatedwith a binary valued
attribute. E.g., nodes in the polblogs network have the attribute party with values; conservative and liberal. For simplicity,
binary values are presented using the notation of R and B, together with the distributions of such values over nodes and
edges. p and τ present the estimated parameter values of the attraction model. Density (d¯) is the fraction of all possible edges,
transitivity (C) is the fraction of triangles of all possible triangle in the network. degree-assortativity (r )measures the similarity
of relations depending on the associated node degree. Average path length (κ) depicts the average shortest path length between
any pairs of nodes.
Network |N | |E | p τ d¯ C r κ
R(%) B(%) R − R(%) B − B(%) R − B(%)
polblogs 1224 16718 0.02 0.22 −0.22 2.49(party) 48 52 44 48 8 0.48 0.84
fb-caltech 769 16656
0.05 0.29 −0.06 1.33(gender) 91.5 8.5 92.8 0.2 7 0.08 0.52
(occupation) 72 28 69 8 23 0.28 0.42
fb-dartmouth 7694 304076
0.01 0.15 0.04 2.76(gender) 86.5 13.5 83.2 0.9 15.9 0.14 0.34
(occupation) 62 38 58 18 24 0.38 0.5
fb-michigan 30147 1176516
0.0026 0.13 0.115 3.05(gender) 92.2 7.8 90.5 0.2 9.3 0.08 0.37
(occupation) 77.5 22.5 72 9 19 0.22 0.46
pokec-1 265388 700352 0.46 0 2 × 10−5 0.0068 −0.044 5.66(gender) 46 54 18.6 22.4 59
amazon-products 303551 835326 0.18 0.99 1.8 × 10−5 0.21 −0.06 17.42(category) 82 18 83.4 16.4 0.2
As an example, Figure 3 shows the proportion of cross-group
ties on the synthetic labelled networks generated from polblogs
topology. The proportion of cross-group ties is proportional to p,
while it is inversely proportional to τ . When p reaches its maximum
(pmax = 0.5 due to the symmetric nature of binary attribute values),
the proportion of cross group ties is relatively larger at minimum
inbreeding coefficient τ .
It should be noted that convergence is not guaranteed for all
possible combinations of p and τ . The swapping procedure holds
constant all graph properties except the mapping of nodes to labels,
and consequently, it may not be possible to find a mapping of nodes
to labels that achieves a target number of ties between groups (when
that number is low as it is for higher values of τ ).
Table 2 presents the graph characteristics of the synthetically
generated labeled graphs.
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our objective is not to measure the success of re-identification
attacks on original datasets in which node identities have been re-
moved: it has been demonstrated long ago [3] that naive anonymiza-
tion of graph datasets does not provide privacy. Instead, our objec-
tive is to quantify the exposure provided by node attributes on top
of the intrinsic vulnerability of the particular graph topology under
attack.
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0.142362 0.255473 0.334849 0.382821 0.399210
0.161562 0.287893 0.377916 0.431331 0.449934
0.16
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0.40
Figure 3: Network: polblogs, proportion of cross group ties
on synthetic networks generated from the original graph
structure.
In our experiments, we leverage the real and synthetic networks
described above. We mount the machine learning attack described
in Section 3.2 to re-identify nodes using features based on both
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Table 2: Basic statistics of generated ERGMnetworks, and the population of node pairs. Note that dc,cc and apl define the set of
parameters that used to generate ERGM graphs based on assortativity (degree correlation), clustering coefficient, and average
path length, respectively. We generated a total of ≈ 500 million identical and non-identical node pairs over three ERGM graph
spaces of the six real social network datasets. S is the population of generated node pairs concerning a given graph topology.
Network ERGM d C r κ |S| (millions)
polblogs
dc 0.02 0.03 .08 2.52 5.5
cc 0.02 0.33 -0.02 2.69 13.1
apl 0.02 0.10 -0.06 2.49 11.5
fb-caltech
dc 0.06 0.08 0.11 2.13 1.2
cc 0.06 0.42 -0.06 2.73 4.1
apl 0.06 0.07 0.11 1.97 1.2
fb-dartmouth
dc 0.01 0.17 0.07 2.66 14.5
cc 0.01 0.24 0.04 2.77 13.2
apl 0.01 0.20 0.04 2.70 14.2
fb-michigan
dc 0.003 0.02 0.12 3.28 38.4
cc 0.002 0.20 0.12 3.52 39.9
apl 0.002 0.20 0.12 3.64 38.2
pokec-1
dc 2.02E-5 0.06 -0.04 5.60 29.5
cc 2.05E-5 0.07 -0.04 5.84 29.3
apl 2.04E-5 0.06 -0.04 5.63 27.3
amazon-products
dc 1.82E-5 0.37 -0.06 11.86 43.7
cc 1.82E-5 0.40 -0.06 13.52 72.5
apl 1.82E-5 0.39 -0.06 13.47 74.3
graph topology and node attributes. Our first guiding question is
thus: How much risk of node re-identification is added to a network
dataset by its binary node attributes?
5.1 The Vulnerability Cost of Node Attributes
Figure 4 presents the accuracy of node re-identification in the orig-
inal graph topology GS and in the same topology augmented with
node attributes GS(LBL). As expected, the re-identification attack
performs (generally) better when node attributes are used in the
attack. Surprising to us, however, is the relatively small vulnera-
bility cost that node attributes introduce. For example, the occu-
pation attribute has a barely noticeable benefit to the attacker in
fb-dartmouth. More interestingly, however, the same attribute per-
forms differently for the other two Facebook networks considered:
for fb-caltech the occupation label functions as noise, leading to
a small decrease in the F1-score. For fb-michigan, on the other
hand, the occupation label significantly improves the attacker’s
performance.
Another observation from this figure is that different node at-
tributes applied to the same topology have different outcomes:
see, for example, the case of the fb-michigan topology, where the
difference between the impacts of the gender and the occupation
attributes is the largest. We thus formulate a new question: What
placement of attributes onto nodes reveal more information?
5.2 Diversity Matters, Homophily Not
To understand how the placement of attribute values on nodes
affects vulnerability, we generate synthetic node attributes in a
controlled manner. By varying p (the diversity ratio) and τ (the bias
of nodes with same-value attributes to be connected by an edge), we
can study the effect of these parameters on node re-identification.
Figure 5 presents the T-statistics of the F1-scores for node re-
identification attacks on the original topology vs. labeled versions of
the original topology. In addition to the original topologies, Figure 5
also presents results on various synthetic networks generated as
presented in Section 4.2.
We observe three phenomena: First, it appears that p is positively
correlated with the T-statistic value measuring the re-identification
impact of attributes. That is, the more diversity (that is, the larger p),
the more vulnerable to re-identification the labeled nodes become
on average. Intuitively, in a highly skewed attribute population,
while the minority nodes will be identified quicker due to node
attributes, the majority remains protected. On the other hand, when
p = 0.5, a network has two equal-sized sets of nodes where each
set takes one of two attribute values. This is explained by the fact
that the NAD feature vector captures more diverse information
in the attributes of neighbots when p is larger. This is also the
explanation for why the node attributes contribute so much more
to vulnerability in the polblogs dataset, which has a large diversity
(p = 0.48) (thus, almost equal numbers of conservative and liberal
blogs). Note that the effect of p on the added vulnerability remains
consistent across all topologies (real and synthetic) tested.
The second observation is that there is no visible pattern on
how τ influences the vulnerability added by binary node attributes.
While this is disappointing from the perspective of story telling, it is
potentially encouraging for data sharing, as it suggests that datasets
that record homophily (or influence, the debate is irrelevant in this
context) do not have to be anonymized by damaging this pattern.
As a specific example, the privacy of a dataset that records an
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Figure 4: Accuracy of predictions is presented using 5 × 2 cross-validation F1-scores. Mean accuracy values are shown for real
network datasets on GS and GS(LBL) along with the T-statistic which describes the difference in means of the GS and GS(LBL)
vectors of prediction probabilities statistically. The network with node attributes is more vulnerable to node re-identification
when T-statistic is positive and large.
information dissemination phenomenon could be provided without
perturbing the cascading-related ties.
The third class of observations is related to the relative effect
of the topological characteristics on the added vulnerability. Both
amazon-products and pokec-1 are orders of magnitude sparser
than the other datasets considered. This means that the topological
information available to the machine learning algorithm is limited.
In this situation, the addition of the attribute information turns out
to be very significant: the T-statistic values for these datasets are
significantly larger than for the other datasets, with values over
400 in some cases.
Another topological effect is noticed when comparing the real
pokec-1 topology with the ERGM-generated ones in Figure 5d:
the node attribute contributes much more to the vulnerability of
the original topology compared to the synthetic topologies. The
reason for this unusual behavior may lay in the different cluster-
ing coefficients of the networks, as seen in Tables 1 and 2: the
ERGM-generated topologies have clustering coefficients one order
of magnitude higher than the original topology (for the same graph
density), which leads to more diverse NDD feature vectors for the
networks with higher clustering and thus richer training informa-
tion. This in turn leads to better accuracy in node re-identification
in the unlabeled ERGM topologies (with higher clustering) than in
the original topology. For example, the maximum F1-score for the
ERGM-dc topology is 0.92 while for the original is 0.76 in pokec-1.
Thus, the relative benefit of the node attribute is significantly higher
when the topology features were poorer.
5.3 Topology Leaks
Figure 6 presents the importance of features that are used in node
re-identification. A high importance score represents a feature that
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Figure 5: Accuracy of predictions is presented using 5 × 2 cross-validation F1-scores. T-statistic between prediction scores of
GS(LBL) and GS are shown. Results are shown across different structures of original and ERGM graphs. Each ERGM graph is
presented using the generated parameters of dc (degree-correlation), cc(clustering coefficient) and apl (average path length)
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is responsible for accurately classifying a large proportion of exam-
ples.
We make three observations from this figure. First, most of the
NAD features (together with node’s attribute value) that represent
node attribute information prove to be important in all datasets.
Second, among the NDD features, only a small number con-
tributes consistently to accurate prediction. As shown in Figures 6c -
6i, the first bin of 1-hop and 2-hop NDD vectors contribute the most.
That is, a high impact on the re-identification of a node is brought
by the number of its neighbors with degrees between 1 and 50. Even
in large networks such as pokec-1 and amazon-products with a
larger range of node degrees, this behavior is observed.
Third, Figure 6 suggests what features explain the effect of di-
versity p on node re-identification in labeled networks. On datasets
with large diversity (such as polblogs or pokec-1), the topological
information contributes less than on datasets with low diversity
(such as fb-caltech (gender)). This is because high diversity
correlates to richer NAD feature vectors, and thus the relative im-
portance of the NAD features increases.
6 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
Ourwork shows that the addition of even a single binary attribute to
nodes in a network graph increases its vulnerability to re-identification.
Previous work showed that vulnerability increases with the addi-
tion of multiple, multi-category attributes [14]. We measure the
vulnerability increase and study how it is affected by network and
attribute properties.
The increase in vulnerability derives from the fact that the ma-
chine learning attackmakes use of the interaction between topology
and the distribution of node labels. Using information about the
distribution of labels in a node’s neighborhood provides additional
leverage for the re-identification process even when labels are rudi-
mentary.
Furthermore, we find that a population’s diversity on the binary
attribute consistently degrades anonymity and increases vulnerabil-
ity. Diversity means a more even distribution of the binary attribute
which produces a more varied set of neighborhood distributions
that a particular node may exhibit. Consequently, nodes are more
easily distinguished from one another by virtue of their differing
neighborhood distributions of labels.
One puzzle remains. There is no consistent discernible impact of
homophily, as measured by the inbreeding coefficient, on vulner-
ability. Our procedure for investigating the impact of homophily
simply involves swapping labels without disturbing ties. Therefore,
both local and global (unlabeled) topologies remain constant as we
decrease the number of cross-group ties to achieve a target value
implied by a particular inbreeding coefficient for a given propor-
tional split along the binary attribute. This procedure disturbs the
local labeled topology but because the machine learning attack uses
information from that local topology it apparently can adapt to
the changes and make equally successful predictions regardless of
the value of the inbreeding coefficient. Perhaps that is why many
different factors in attacks on the labeled graphs have some degree
of responsibility for success and, no relatively small subset gets the
lion’s share of the credit.
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Figure 6: Probability distribution of the feature importance scores across original networks. NDD features are presented in
the index order of node (N), hop (H) and bin (B). As an example, the feature N1-H2-B1 presents the first bin of the NDD21[k]
vector. NAD features are presented in the index order of node (N), hop (H) and binary attribute value ∈ R,B. As an example,
the feature N1-H2-R presents NAD21[R]. Any feature that does not contribute to the final prediction decision with at least 1% of
the samples in average is omitted.
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